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Cornhusker Economics
The Economic Impacts of Social Activism in Food Markets
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Southwest NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Southeast NE, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White Oats, No.1/2, Bulk
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
NADried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

10-16-20

*

*

107.00

156.18

162.21

159.57

150.88

150.60

148.72

217.93

222.12

211.74

62.11

64.30

59.30
76.74

79.83

96.99

139.55

129.87

160.11

403.37

424.93

440.83

3.74

NA

5.12

3.74

NA

3.80

8.41

NA

9.89

6.02

NA

4.85

3.09

2.96

3.13

*

NA

NA

107.50

NA

NA

95.00

NA

NA

147.50

151.00

168.20

52.50

44.08

50.67

Private politics, usually led by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and social activists, focuses
on changing the behavior of private economic
agents through social pressure rather than
through government action (although government action is also possible) (Baron, 2003). The
food sector has been experiencing increased social
pressure from social activist organizations to
achieve diverse goals, ranging from improving
food safety and food fortification to increasing
transparency in food markets. A primary reason
for the increase in organized activism in the food
sector is the proliferation of the provision of credence attributes which are attributes unobservable through search or experience (consumption
and use). The majority of these credence attributes are related to a product’s production process
(e.g., raised without antibiotics, GMO free, gluten
free, fair trade) and their provision is not mandated by the government but instead firms choose to
‘self-regulate’ and voluntarily provide them to
appeal to consumers who value them. The voluntary provision and the lack of well-defined standards for many of these attributes (e.g., claims that
the product is 100% natural, ethically produced or
produced in a socially responsible manner) create
an opportunity for the emergence of fraudulent
behavior which often takes the form of firms
making false or misleading claims about its
product’s quality.
There are numerous examples where social activist organizations such as the Changing Markets
Foundation, the Organic Consumers Association
(OCA), SumOfUs and Greenpeace, have exerted

It is the policy of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln not to discriminate based upon age, race,
ethnicity, color, national origin, gender-identity, sex, pregnancy, disability, sexual orientation,
genetic information, veteran’s status, marital status, religion or political affiliation.

social pressure on food firms, who, according to these
activists, have made false and/or misleading claims
about their products and/or business practices. These
organized social activist groups often collaborate with
different players in the markets such as competitors of
the firms they target, research organizations and
NGOs and conduct research to identify irresponsible
corporate practices. Based on this research, the activists may decide to launch campaigns, which are organized series of events, to fulfill desired goals. Campaign documents reveal that activist organizations
whose primary goal is to remove false and misleading
claims will initially make demands on the target firm
to remove these claims. If the target firm rejects these
demands, then the activists will exert social pressure
which can take multiple forms, such as, (1) harming
the reputation of the firm with name and shame campaigns that publicize the activists’ research findings,
(2) signing petitions, (3) encouraging citizens to vote
on a referendum to repeal existing legislature, (4) calling for boycotts of the firm’s products or (5) even disrupting the regular activities of the firm by protesting
outside their offices.
A recent example of social activism in food markets is
the launch of the “Busting the Myth” campaign
against Nestle, which is one of the global leaders in
the infant milk formula market, by the Changing
Markets Foundation and the International Baby Food
Action Network (IBFAN). The objective of the campaign was to remove misleading and false claims
made by Nestle with regard to the various infant milk
formulas and to ensure that Nestle improved their
standards by removing harmful content from their
products. Specifically, the activists argued that Nestle
made contradictory claims about the benefits and potential harm of sucrose and vanilla compounds in infant milk formula. For instance, while the company
advised against giving sucrose and vanilla in Brazil
and Hong Kong, its infant milk formula sold in Africa
did contain sucrose. The campaign also accused the
company of making false claims about its product being ‘closest to breastmilk’ and thereby, breaking established standards set by the World Health Organization.
Similarly, the OCA launched “The Myth of the Natural Food” campaign where the main objective was to
remove natural label claims. OCA argues that when
firms such as Nature Valley, Post Shredded Wheat
and Sioux Honey Association use the claim natural

for their products, consumers automatically equate
natural to organic, which provides the opportunity
to mislead consumers for economic gains. OCA
has also directed social pressure on Tyson for making misleading claims that it is following socially
responsible practices.
The success of activist campaigns depends, to a
great extent, on support from the public.
GlobeScan’s Trust in Institutions surveys show that
NGOs rank highest in public trust compared to the
United Nations, large local companies, national
governments, and global companies, in that order
(Baron, 2012). Given the increased presence of social activist organizations in the food sector and the
rise of large-scale organized campaigns, it is important to analyze the economic impacts of their
presence in food markets. Researchers in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln are examining the economic impacts of the presence of activists who exert social pressure with the objective of removing
false and misleading claims when well-defined
standards for the credence attributes provided by
food firms do not exist. The credence nature of the
food product attributes and the lack of well-defined
standards create an informational asymmetry between the firm and other parties (e.g., consumers,
regulators, activists) that the firm may choose to
exploit. The removal of false and misleading claims
by food firms can have important welfare implications for both consumers and producers. The study
derives the conditions under which an activist will
be effective in removing misleading and false
claims and provides insights as to how the presence
of private politics in food markets affects market
outcomes and the welfare of agents along the supply chain when the activist is effective as well as
when they are ineffective or incorrectly target a
firm.
Specifically, the study develops a game-theoretic
framework that includes the following players: two
firms – a self-regulator that provides a credence
attribute and a profit maximizer that provides a
basic good – a continuum of heterogeneous consumers and a confrontational activist. Consumers
value the credence attribute, but they differ in their
strength of preference for it, and they revise their
perceived quality valuation of the firm’s product if
the firm is targeted by the activist (this accounts for

the reputational harm faced by the targeted firm if the
activist’s campaign succeeds). The activist values market transparency, her utility decreases in the discrepancy between the quality the firm produces and the
claims it makes about this quality and receives utility
from targeting the firm. The self-regulating firm decides on the level of quality of the credence attribute it
will supply in the market and the claims it will make
about this quality.
Study results show that even in the presence of an activist who always monitors the firm and accurately
identifies discrepancies between the firm’s actual and
claimed quality, there are conditions under which a
self-regulating firm has an incentive to misrepresent
its true quality. The greater is the effectiveness of the
activist and the reputational harm the firm faces if the
activist’s campaign succeeds, the less likely it is that
the firm will misrepresent its true quality. Interestingly, results show that if the firm finds it optimal to misrepresent its quality, the presence of the activist does
not affect the outrageousness of the firm’s claims.
However, the presence of the activist can alter the

optimal quality the firm actually produces and
supplies n the market; the optimal quality is greater when the activist is present in the market than
when she is absent. This occurs because by choosing a greater quality, the firm can strategically alter
the activist’s incentive to target the firm and the
probability that a campaign, if launched, will be
successful. Finally, results show that while the activist can play an important role in increasing market transparency resulting in significant welfare
gains for consumers, a benevolent yet ineffective
activist can lead to welfare losses that may be
greater than those present when the activist is absent and consumers are uninformed.
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